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JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING IN FEDERAL
PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES, 1978-1997
Theodore Eisenberg*
In 1992, Professor James Henderson and I wrote that, throughout
the 1980s, a quiet, pro-defendant revolution in products liability had
occurred.1 That revolution was likely largely the product of a "wide-
spread, independent shift in judicial attitudes."' 2 It was not discern-
able in cases tried before juries.3 The federal data used in that study
were available through 1989. Also in 1992, using the same database,
Professor Kevin Clermont and I wrote about the surprising relation
between plaintiff win rates in judge and jury trials in products liability
cases.4 Plaintiffs prevailed at a higher rate before judges than they did
before juries. Comparable data are now available through fiscal 1997
and it is appropriate to reexamine time trends in products liability
cases related to judicial decisionmaking.
Assessing judicial performance in products liability cases requires
reference points. It is natural to compare plaintiff win rates and trial
award levels in judge-tried cases with similar statistics in jury-tried
cases, and to compare products liability case outcomes to outcomes of
other classes of cases.
The results both confirm and extend prior findings. The striking
difference in trial win rates between judge and jury trials continues.
Plaintiffs prevail in over 40% of the judge trials and only about 30%
of the jury trials. Trial award patterns confirm that higher stakes cases
are routed to juries. But the time trend in award patterns between
products liability cases and contracts cases is strikingly similar. If trial
* Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
1. Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products
Liability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 731 (1992) [hereinafter Inside the Quiet Revolution].
2. Id. at 734. For further support or acknowledgment of this thesis, see Kenneth J. Chesebro,
Galileo's Retort: Peter Huber's Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1637, 1717-18 (1993); Mark
F. Grady, Accident Law Seeks to Limit Insurance Effects, 1 MICH. L. & POL'+ REV. 11, 33 (1996);
Marc S. Moller & Paul Indig, Products Liability Law Revisited: A Realistic Perspective, 31 TORT
& INS. L.J. 879, 880 (1996); Teresa M. Schwartz, Product Liability Reform by the Judiciary, 27
GONZ. L. REV. 303, 318-33 (1991).
3. Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Is the Quiet Revolution in Products Liabil-
ity Reflected in Trial Outcomes?, CORNELL L. FORUM, July 1990, at 2, 3.
4. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empirism,
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adjudicators are increasingly generous towards products liability
plaintiffs, they are similarly inclined toward contract case plaintiffs.
Among tried products liability cases, the time trend in awards of
judge-tried cases is more similar than different from the trend in jury-
tried cases. The distribution of trial awards has approximately the
same shape, but jury awards tend to be higher.
Pretrial adjudication tells an especially telling story about judicial
treatment of products liability cases. Most products cases are tried
before juries so trial patterns can only reveal so much about judges'
behavior. All products liability cases must survive pretrial judicial
scrutiny. The time-trend here is strikingly anti-plaintiff. Of those
cases that survive early pretrial skirmishing, and end in pretrial judg-
ment, an increasing percentage is resulting in pretrial judgment in
favor of defendants.
Part I of this article describes the data used. Part II presents the
results.
I. THE DATA
Previous work discusses the methodology and sources used.5
Therefore, I only summarize the data here and note changes from the
earlier data. The data consist of all federal district court cases termi-
nated from 1978 to 1997. The Administrative Office of the United
States Courts compiles the data and makes them publicly available
through the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Re-
search.6 The earlier study covered federal data for the fiscal years
1979 to 1987.7 Although the Administrative Office data are organized
by fiscal years, I present them on a calendar year basis. This method-
ology facilitates comparison with other annual data, such as the con-
sumer price index ("CPI").8 The calendar year 1978 data cover the
5. See id. at 1133-35; James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in
Products Liability, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479, 499-503, 518-22 (1990) [hereinafter The Quiet
Revolution].
6. See The Quiet Revolution, supra note 5, at 518-22. For a complete description of Adminis-
trative Office data, see INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL RE-
SEARCH, FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE, 1970-1997, ICPSR 8429 (1998)
[hereinafter ICPSR]. For easy access to this database, see Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M.
Clermont, Judicial Statistical Inquiry Form (last modified Nov. 15, 1998) <http://teddy.law.cor-
nell.edu:8090/questata.htm> (discussing Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Courts in
Cyberspace, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 94 (1996)).
7. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 1133.
8. The district court data include the Administrative Office's general personal injury products
liability category, as well as the more specialized personal injury products categories: airplane,




last six months of that year. The 1997 data cover the first nine months
of that year. Data for all other calendar years cover twelve months.
I group the Administrative Office's several different products liabil-
ity categories into a single category. 9 I exclude asbestos cases on the
ground that they have become a world unto themselves. For some
years, the number of asbestos cases filed exceeded filings for all other
federal products liability cases combined.10
II. OUTCOMES INFLUENCED BY JUDGES AND
A COMPARISON WITH JURIES
Judges can influence case processing in several ways. By pretrial
dismissals or grants of judgment they can determine which side
prevails. Of those cases that reach trial, many are tried before judges
rather than juries. In bench trials, judges determine both the winner
and the level of award. Even in jury trials, judges can exert substantial
influence over the outcome through pretrial motions, evidentiary rul-
ings, and post-judgment motions. I first present results pertaining to
plaintiff trial win rates, then discuss trial award patterns, and conclude
by reporting judicial treatment of cases adjudicated prior to trial.
A. Trial Win Rates
In 1992, using data through 1989, Professor Clermont and I showed
the distinctive pattern of trial win rates in products liability cases. De-
spite widespread belief in juror sympathy for injured plaintiffs, we
found that plaintiffs in products liability cases had significantly greater
win rates in judge trials than in jury trials." Table 1 demonstrates that
this pattern continues. For the twenty-year period (with data on a half
year for 1978 and nine months for 1997), plaintiffs' mean trial win
rates in products liability judge trials were 43.8% compared to 30.6%
in jury trials. The result is not a consequence of one or a few years.
This pattern holds for eighteen of the twenty years studied and the
difference is highly statistically significant. 12
9. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 1136 n.37.
10. See Inside the Quiet Revolution, supra note 1, at 734 n.6.
11. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 1137.
12. Table 1 also shows that products liability cases join in the national long-term trend toward
fewer trials. The absolute number of trials is quite consistently decreasing. The extremely low
jury trial win rate in 1985 (11.0%) is a consequence of the consolidated Bendectin trial in the
Southern District of Ohio, which resulted in a defeat for plaintiffs. See Inside the Quiet Revolu-
tion, supra note 1, at 743.
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TABLE 1. PLAINTIFF TRIAL WIN RATES, FEDERAL COURT
JUDGE TRIALS AND JURY TRIALS, 1978-1997
Year Judge trial Number of Jury trial Number of Combined win Total
win rate (%) judge trials win rate (%) jury trials rate (%) trials
1978 57.7 26 40.3 119 43.4 145
1979 39.0 41 35.6 250 36.1 291
1980 54.2 72 36.5 400 39.2 472
1981 42.6 122 38.9 428 39.6 550
1982 39.8 103 33.0 445 34.3 548
1983 37.4 115 35.0 457 35.5 572
1984 50.5 93 40.7 450 42.4 543
1985 38.2 89 11.0 1240 12.9 1329
1986 49.2 63 31.4 385 33.9 448
1987 55.9 59 34.7 337 37.9 396
1988 53.2 62 33.3 312 36.6 374
1989 44.4 45 36.3 322 37.3 367
1990 46.2 26 39.6 273 40.1 299
1991 24.3 37 35.3 278 34.0 315
1992 32.4 34 35.3 272 35.0 306
1993 45.9 37 30.0 237 32.1 274
1994 31.4 35 31.2 260 31.2 295
1995 39.4 33 29.3 229 30.5 262
1996 46.7 30 26.3 209 28.9 239
1997 44.4 18 31.3 163 32.6 181
Total 43.8 1140 30.6 7066 32.4 8206
As before, one should not interpret this substantial difference in
trial win rates as evidence that judges favor products liability plaintiffs
more than juries. The more sober explanation probably rests in the
routing of cases between the two adjudicators. Plaintiffs, their law-
yers, and most other observers of the legal system believe the jury to
be more sympathetic to plaintiffs, on average, than the judge. Plain-
tiffs therefore route a weaker set of cases to juries. When juries turn
out to process cases about the same as judges,'13 plaintiffs achieve de-
pressed win rates before juries.
B. Trial Award Trends
It is often noted that trial awards of one kind or another are increas-
ing or otherwise changing over time. So, for example, one might note,
as shown below, that the mean and median award in tried products
liability cases has increased over time. But how should such an in-
crease be interpreted? The increase might reveal something about the
processing of products liability cases by juries or by judges. Or the
increase might mean that products liability cases reflect larger trends
that transcend particular case categories. Without a useful baseline it
is impossible to know.
13. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 1152-53.
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1. Comparing Award Levels in Products Liability Trials and
Contracts Trials
To compare award trends in products liability cases with back-
ground activity levels in the legal system, I compare products liability
cases with contracts actions. For purposes of comparison, this study
uses a 25% random sample of federal contracts actions 14 for the same
time period from 1978 through 1997.
Figure 1 presents the mean award for plaintiffs in cases tried to
judgment. One line represents the mean award in all products liability
trials. The second line represents the mean award in a 25% sample of
the largest general category of contracts cases. The contracts case
sample includes awards in 2,576 plaintiff trial victories. The products
liability case sample includes awards in 3,093 plaintiff trial victories.
Dollar amounts are adjusted to 1997 dollars and are stated in terms of
logs.
FIGURE 1. MEAN TRIAL AWARDS, CONTRACTS AND PRODUCTS
LIABILITY CASES, 1978-1997
0 products cases A contracts cases
I I I I I
78 80 82 84 86
year of
88 90 92 94 96
termination
14. I use the most general and largest Administrative Office contracts category, "other con-
tract actions" (code 190). ICPSR, supra note 6.
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The figure reveals three noteworthy patterns. First, products liabil-
ity trials involve higher mean awards than contract trials. In almost
every year, the mean products case trial award exceeds the mean con-
tracts case trial award. Since the case categories are so different, this
result simply tells us that the damages in products cases tend to be
higher. Whether they are artificially inflated by sympathetic adjudica-
tors is not revealed by the case category comparison.
Second, the time trend for the two case categories is strikingly simi-
lar. Within a one-year lag or lead period, the awards generally follow
the same trend. Most noticeable is an increase from the early to mid-
1980s, a peak in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and a decline in the
mid-1990s. These fluctuations occur against a background of gener-
ally increasing awards in both classes of cases. A plot of median
rather than mean awards tells essentially the same story.
The contract cases line serves as an important reference point. If
one saw only the products liability time trend, it would be difficult to
resist the temptation to speculate that adjudicators, mostly juries, 15
somehow became more generous in the early 1990s, following and
preceding periods of more temperate awards. Furthermore, despite
questionable evidence of systematic juror sympathy to plaintiffs,16 ju-
ries would be regarded as having become increasingly sympathetic to
plaintiffs because of the generally increased trend in mean products
case awards.
But the presence of the contracts case reference point suggests an
alternative class of explanations. Looking at the figure, it is even
more difficult to resist the speculation that whatever forces drive the
time trend in products awards probably drive the trend in contracts
cases as well. It could be reactions to inflation patterns, to external
economic conditions, or something else. The important point is that
the time trend in products liability cases is anything but distinctive. It
seems to be associated with products cases being embedded in a larger
legal system.
Third, in recent years, the difference between mean awards in prod-
ucts and contracts trials has been shrinking. In 1993, 1994, 1995, and
1997, that difference is at historically low levels. So, relative to the
presumably sober area of contract adjudication, awards in products
liability cases may in fact be falling rather than increasing.
15. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 1141 (finding that 88% of federal products
liability cases are tried to juries).
16. See id. at 1152; Valerie Hans, The Illusions and Realities of Jurors' Treatment of Corporate
Defendants, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 327, 352-53 (1998).
[Vol. 49:323
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2. Comparing Award Levels in Judge Trials and Jury Trials
Contracts cases and products cases follow the same trends. What
about jury-tried cases and judge-tried cases? Figure 2 shows, for each
year, the median award (in logs) in products liability judge trials and
the median award in products liability jury trials. Because there are so
few judge-tried products liability cases, the judge line is noisier. In
general, the trends are similar through about 1990. But in the early
1990s, jury awards peaked and judge awards stayed more level. By
the mid-1990s, strikingly, the median judge award exceeded the mean
jury award (both in logs) in three of four years. Figure 2 also shows
that, at least before the 1990s, median awards in jury-tried cases are
higher than awards in judge-tried cases. This is consistent with high-
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A cautionary note about making too much of the relation between
judge and jury trial awards is in order, and especially the trend to-
wards judge awards exceeding jury awards after 1992. The judge trials
data are based on a small number of awards. Table 1 shows that the
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total number of products liability judge trials from 1993 through 1997
was 153. Plaintiffs win only about one-third of the trials. So the
awards data for judges are based on about fifty trials. But the results
remain striking. For the entire period after 1992 taken as a whole,
both the mean and median judge trial award have exceeded the mean
and median jury trial award. The differences are not statistically sig-
nificant but they are in a surprising direction.
It is difficult to tell from Figure 2 whether the noisier judge line
reflects systematically different variation than the jury line. In fact,
although the mean and median jury award is higher, the variation in
awards is no greater in jury-tried cases than in judge-tried cases. The
first two rows in Table 2 present descriptive statistics for products lia-
bility judge and jury trials for all twenty years aggregated together.
The standard deviations are not noticeably different and one cannot
reject the hypothesis that there is no difference in their standard
deviations. 17
TABLE 2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, JUDGE AND JURY TRIAL
AWARDS, FEDERAL PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND
CONTRACTS CASES, 1978-1997
Mean award Median award
(logs of thousands (logs of thousands Standard Number
of dollars) of dollars) deviation of cases
Products judge trials 5.23 5.15 2.05 469
Products jury trials 5.94 5.96 2.12 2335
Contracts judge trials 4.71 4.42 2.04 1226
Contracts jury trials 5.36 5.14 2.11 876
Using contracts cases as a comparison group again adds perspective
to the judge-jury comparison. The relation between judge and jury
awards in contracts cases is similar to that in products liability cases.
The jury-trial mean and median awards substantially exceed the
judge-trial mean and median awards. The standard deviations of the
awards are not significantly different. 18
Figure 3 presents the frequency distributions of judge and jury trial
awards in products liability cases. It thus provides information in ad-
dition to that provided by statistics summarizing central tendencies.
The jury distribution is substantially and significantly right-shifted.
Higher stakes cases emerge from jury trials. But the shapes of the
17. An F-test of the hypothesis that the standard deviations are the same yields a significance
level (p-value) of 0.408.
18. An F-test of the hypothesis that the standard deviations are the same yields a significance
level (p-value) of 0.328.
[Vol. 49:323
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distributions are quite similar; hence the insignificant variation in the
standard deviations. Judicial award patterns mirror those of jury
award patterns once one accounts for the generally smaller stakes of
judge-tried cases.
FIGURE 3. DISTRIBUTIONS OF JUDGE AND JURY TRIAL AWARDS,
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C. Pretrial Win Rate Trends
So far the focus has been on cases adjudicated by judge or jury after
trial. The mass of cases never reach trial. Trial rates in federal courts
in recent years are well under 5%.19 By granting or denying pretrial
motions, judges exert a powerful influence over what cases reach trial
and on the outcome of cases that do not reach trial. But many pretrial
dispositions are more influenced by the parties' desires to settle or
withdraw cases than by judicial rulings on the merits of cases. To
study the pattern of pretrial judicial rulings, I screen out cases less
likely to be dominated by parties' agreements or unilateral acts than
by judges. The Administrative Office groups cases into twelve proce-
19. See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994
Wis. L. REV. 631, 633.
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dural progress stages.20 For purposes of this pretrial analysis, I also
drop cases adjudicated before issue was joined and those decided after
issue was joined but in which no court action occurred. This leaves a
residue of cases in which judgments that were entered should tend to
be based on action by the judge. Because I am interested in studying
win rates, I further limit the sample to cases in which judgment was
entered for plaintiff or defendant. Figure 4 presents the results of
such pretrial outcomes over time.21 In recent years, pretrial plaintiff
win rates in products liability and contracts cases both show steady
declines, with the products decline being steeper than the contracts
decline. Through the late 1970s and most of the 1980s, plaintiffs were
FIGURE 4. PLAINTIFF PRETRIAL WIN RATES, FEDERAL PRODUCTS
LIABILITY AND CONTRACTS CASES, 1978-1997
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20. The procedural stages and their numeric codes are as follows: 01: Before issue joined, no
court action; 02: Before issue joined, order entered; 03: After issue joined, no court action; 04:
After issue joined, judgment on motion; 05: After issue joined, pretrial conference held; 06:
After issue joined, during court trial; 07: After issue joined, during jury trial; 08: After issue
joined, after court trial; 09: After issue joined, after jury trial; 10: After issue joined, other; 11:
Before issue joined, hearing held; 12: Before issue joined, motion decided. ICPSR, supra note 6.
21. Figure 4 excludes cases from the Eastern District of New York terminated in 1984 and
cases from the Eastern District of Virginia terminated in 1990. The districts had large consoli-
dated cases in which judgments simultaneously disposed of hundreds of cases. The New York
cases were resolved against plaintiffs and the Virginia cases were resolved for plaintiffs.
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receiving an increasing percentage of the trial judgments in contracts
cases. In products liability cases, however, plaintiffs were faring worse
and worse for about a decade. For once our contracts and products
lines do not match in one significant respect. Amidst the claims of
products liability law being highly favorable to plaintiffs, judges were
in fact entering pretrial judgments at increasing rates for defendants, a
trend that has now lasted for about two decades.
More than one reason can explain this pro-defendant trend. It is
possible that judges have become increasingly hostile to products lia-
bility claims. It is also possible that the judges have been seeing a set
of products liability cases of decreasing quality over time. In the
midst of increasing loss rates, plaintiffs would have to be bringing in-
creasingly weaker cases. One might expect that increasing losses
would lead to plaintiffs shifting to a stronger set of cases.
III. CONCLUSION
Most public discussion of products liability cases focuses on juries.
This is understandable in light of the dominance of jury trials in prod-
ucts cases. Awards in judge-tried cases can shed light on jury trial
outcomes. The similarity of award patterns suggests an essential simi-
larity between trial adjudicators. Juries see higher stakes cases, so
headline-grabbing awards tend to be in jury trials. Though in recent
years awards in judge-tried products cases have in fact exceeded
awards in jury-tried products cases.
The headlines and most commentators ignore the mass of products
cases that never reach trial. Most cases settle or are adjudicated by
judges. Here, the evidence suggests that judges continue to increas-
ingly resist products liability claims. Of cases in which judgment is
entered before trial, it is increasingly entered for products liability
defendants.
1999]
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